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Until the 1970s, South Africa represented a telling example of a
fairly industrialised economy in which growth and development
were facilitated by high levels of political repression. Gold
mining almost from its start required huge numbers of cheap
migrant labourers; gold's fixed price, the low quality of the ore
and heavy capital outlays made a coercive labour system a
condition of the industry's prosperity until the 1940s (1). The
expansion of secondary industry during the Second World War
enabled manufacturing to outstrip mining's contribution to GDP by
1945 (2). This development was accompanied by accelerating
urbanisation and the establishment in the main cities of a
relatively skilled and increasingly well organised African
working class (3). In certain respects, the "Apartheid"
programmes of the Afrikaner Nationalist government elected in
1948 were directed at reversing the economic and social gains
achieved by urbanised Africans during the previous decade.
Reinforced controls on black labour mobility, intensified
territorial segregation of blacks and whites, the curtailment of
black collective bargaining rights, the removal of Africans'
already very limited access to the franchise, and the suppression
of popular political organisations, all these helped to ensure
the attraction of massive flows of foreign capital into import
substitution industries which the government helped to boost with
walls of protective tariffs. Between 1950 and 1970, annual real
GDP growth averaged at 5 per cent (4).
In the 1970s, though, the economic costs of white supremacy began
to outweigh the benefits. The denial of technical training to
blacks underlay an alarming skills shortage. Low wages tightly
limited the expansion of the domestic market. Increasing
resources were required to staff and equip a huge public sector,
much of it concerned with the administration of apartheid
controls or with expensive economic projects conceived in
anticipation of international embargoes on strategic imports.
Moreover, controls notwithstanding, economic growth in the 1960s
had nurtured a second rapid expansion of the African industrial
working class, much of it in the main cities, despite the
government's efforts to relocate labour and industries outside
towns (5). This growth was matched by swelling primary and
secondary school enrolments (6). By the early 1970s, black
workers still lacked basic rights but with their skills, their
growing literacy, and their numerical weight in the industrial
economy, their bargaining power had become dramatically enhanced.
During the next two decades economic recession, labour militancy,
localised communal rebellions in black townships, guerilla
insurgency, capital flight, credit restrictions, and the
spiralling expense of militarised government all combined in 1989
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to persuade the government to lift the legal restrictions on the
black opposition and begin a negotiated democratisation.
This history seems to add confirmation to the contention that "it
is not the structural correspondence between capitalism and
democracy which explains the persistence of democracy" but rather
"capitalist development is associated with democracy because it
transforms the class structure" (7). Some theorists may argue
that (political) "participation in the social order" is at
certain stages in an economy's development a prerequisite for
"sustained economic growth" (8), but if this is the case it does
not follow that states and ruling groups concede power and rights
voluntarily. In South Africa democratisation is taking place
because "pressures from subordinate classes have (become) strong
enough to make demands for their inclusion credible" (9).
Historically, high levels of political repression facilitated
capitalist economic development. In time, though, such
repression became increasingly difficult to maintain in the face
of social changes generated by industrialisation.
Pressure from subordinate classes was undoubtedly the crucial
agency in determining political transition in South Africa (10).
Any attempt to predict the outcome of this transition must first
investigate the political predispositions of popular classes as
well as the institutions with which they will engage before
looking at the developmental tasks which will confront a
democratised government. After considering the question of
whether these tasks can be tackled under democratic conditions,
this essay will address the more general question, which arises
from this case study, of whether democracy can help to foster
development in developing countries.
2.
How strong are democratic inclinations amongst most South
Africans? For most of this century, extremely authoritarian
government co-existed with more or less racially exclusive
representative institutions. But though liberal rights and
freedoms enjoyed by white citizens had little impact on the
everyday lives of black South Africans they were not wholly
meaningless to blacks either. Under National Party rule, the
judiciary retained a measure of its former independence though,
increasingly, of course, it had to apply racist legislation (11).
A privately owned press allowed blacks a few significant channels
for the expression of political ideas; despite censorship, mass
daily newspapers from the late sixties helped to shape and give
voice to popular feelings (12). In 1979, labour legislation
instituted legal rights and obligations for black trade unions
giving formal recognition to their role in a fifty year history
of attempting represent black workers. Until 1959, a tiny
minority of Africans voters had parliamentary representation in
the form of four "native representatives" and three "native
senators" (13). In the Cape until 1938, African participation in
the common roll franchise was of considerable symbolic importance
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to the African political elite. Popular political organisations,
including the ANC and the Communist Party participated in
township Advisory Board elections until the late 1950s (14) .
Coloureds only lost all their common roll franchise rights in
1972 (15). It is conceivable then, that even the very restricted
experience black South Africans had of the rights and freedoms
associated with liberal democracy, may have helped to influence
their political values.
Black organisations can make claims of varying strength to
liberal and democratic traditions. The African National Congress
until 1960 represented a broad church accommodating socially
conservative and radical nationalists, democratic socialists,
liberal constitutionalists, and marxists of various persuasions.
During the 1950s, while its leaders professed a quite sincere
admiration for British political institutions, communists helped
to draft a "Freedom Charter" with the intention of positioning
the ANC on a non capitalist path of transition to socialism after
the successful conclusion of a "national democratic" revolution
(16). The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the
People, a pageant-like gathering which voted unanimously on each
clause of the draft. The document itself was written after a
year-long campaign in which activists collected popular demands.
Whatever the procedural shortcomings of the process, it did
dramatically emphasise the ANC's commitment to a populist notion
of people's sovereignty (17).
Until the late 1950s, ANC organisation was quite federal in
character with each province constituting a fairly autonomous
organisational unit; this helped to sustain ideological
diversity. A new constitution drawn up by Oliver Tambo attempted
to create a more centralised hierarchy, making junior leadership
echelons subject to the authority of more senior bodies.
Leadership at all levels was to be elected; at conferences,
through a show of hands. In fact, leadership positions were
contested less frequently in the 1950s than before, partly
because of the ANC's habit of nominating "caretaker" officials to
replace men and women who were legally banned from holding
political office but who continued to exercise informal authority
behind the scenes. This practice tended to detract from those
ANC's constitutional procedures which were intended to safeguard
internal democracy. On one occasion when ideological schisms
threatened to disrupt a provincial congress, in the Transvaal in
1958, the dissenting faction were forced to withdraw by an
assembly of loyalist "volunteers" armed with sticks and iron bars
(18). On the whole, though, political disagreements within and
between groups in black politics did not in this period lead to
violence; quite apart from a strong moral commitment to peaceful
conduct by a protestant missionary trained leadership, black
organisations were too weak and small for the stakes involved in
their competition with each other to be matters of life and
death. Even so, at the time, the ANC attracted fierce criticism
from liberal critics, particularly because the presence of
communists in its leadership, who were accused of operating as a
manipulative caucus(19).
As an exile insurgent body, the ANC necessarily acquired a more
disciplined and autocratic character; no leadership elections
were held between 1959 and 1935, and the participants at the
Kabwe conference were presented with a single list of candidates
for the national executive chosen by the president, Oliver. Tambo
(20). The organisation became less tolerant of ideological
diversity despite its continued protestations of serving as a
"African parliament inclusive of all political persuasions" (21).
Exile certainly accentuated the influence of the Communist Party
whose members appeared to play a preponderant role in defining
the organisation's intellectual life (22). Guerilla warfare in
the 1980s helped to militarise the ANC's approach to political
and strategic questions; this was especially the case after the
formal adoption of an insurrectionary doctrine of people's war at
the 1985 "consultative conference". Harsh treatment of mutineers
and suspected traitors in the ANC's detention camps also weakened
any remaining democratic impulses within the organisation. The
ANC exiles returned home with a well developed set of
authoritarian and bureaucratic reflexes. Back in South Africa,
though, they encountered the very different political culture
which had evolved during their absence.
In the 1970s and 1980s two successive waves of organisation
building had endowed black South African communities with a
unprecedently dense network of voluntary associations. The
pioneers in this process were the trade unions started in the
wake of the strikes which broke out in Natal in 1973. The
university students and labour veterans who established the
advice centres from which the unions proliferated drew on a
critical understanding of South African labour history as well as
international models for inspiration; in contrast to earlier
Communist initiatives the 1970 unions emphasised tight factory
based organisation, highly trained shop steward leadership, and a
focus on workplace related concerns together with an eschewal of
external political links. Leadership accountability, honest
finances, and shop floor militancy were key attributes of this
new unionism. These organisations, united from 1978 in the
FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) grouping
concentrated on obtaining management recognition rather than
altering state policy. Their militant economism helped to
promote an ideology of "workerism". This stressed the importance
of working class political autonomy and the dangers of workers
joining or forming alliances with socially amorphous nationalist
parties (23). Since 1985, with the merger that year of the FOSATU
group with the ANC aligned "community" unions, the political
posture of the labour movement shifted, with former "workerists"
acknowledging the interdependence of shop-floor and community
struggles. The new Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) rapidly assumed a leading role in the alliance of
organisations which broadly acknowledged the ANC's moral
authority, but trade union loyalty to the ANC was not without
qualifications (24).
The new unions supplied skills, experience, and models which
could be applied to other forms of organisation. In the early
1980s, strategic decisions by activists and deteriorating social
conditions in townships both helped to prompt the formation of
local "civic associations", a movement which mushroomed to
embrace even rural settlements in remote homelands. The growth
of the civic movement was paralleled by the spread of classroom
organisation and the subsequent construction of "Youth
Congresses". Labour militancy, periodic upsurges of school
rebellion, the revival of internal ANC networks by "prison
graduates", and the re-ignition in 1978 of "armed struggle" all
helped to stimulate organisation building and to politicise
existing associational activity. Much of this organisation was
intensely localised and participatory in character; taking its
cue from the trade union experience it attempted to practice a
form of direct democracy in which leaders and representatives
were simply bearers of popular mandates. In practice, much of
the history of the civic movement fell short of this ideal,
especially after its deployment as a component in the United
Democratic Front in the ANC's "ungovernability" campaign (25).
In some locations, though, civic associations managed to
establish a network of neighbourhood committees which represented
rather impressive efforts at local popular empowerment (26).
Their notions of democracy were informed by a conviction that
democratic institutions could and should reflect the general
will. As a "UDF Message" put it in "Grassroots", one of the most
successful community newspapers which flourished at the time:
"Our structures must become organs of peoples' power... Ordinary
people (must) increasingly take part in all the decisions... Few
people making all the decisions must end" (27). For a
contributor to "New Era", a publication affiliated to the Cape
Town UDF: "Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of
the broad working masses to participate in and control all the
dimensions of their lives. This, for us, is the essence of
democracy, not some pluralistic debating society notion of a
'thousand schools contending' " (28). In this vein, UDF leaders
sometimes said they were opposed to the holding of a round table
constitutional conference (29). Democracy was not negotiable.
Now, whether the UDF and its affiliates succeeded in embodying
"people's power" is a subject of continuing academic controversy
(30) but this need not detain us here. What is significant is
that a participatory democratic ideal was a vital ingredient of
the activist culture nurtured in the 1980s and it persists in the
minds of many supporters of the civic movement today who remain
deeply sceptical about the benefits of liberal parliamentarianism
(31).
If a democratic political culture depended only on high levels of
popular political activity, than the habits and attitudes
engendered by the township rebellion would hold out considerable
hope for the future. Some of this hope would not be misplaced.
The communal organisations constructed in the 1980s did help to
change popular attitudes to unjust authority, to alter popular
expectations from government, and instill more egalitarian
political values (32) . Any minimal definition of democracy,
though, must include freedom of political choice and political
association. The participatory structures developed in the 1980s
did not acknowledge the moral legitimacy of political
differences; their pyramidal organisational structure reflected a
view of the community as an organic unity. Competition between
the followers different black political organisations has become
extremely violent, claiming 4,364 lives in 1993 (33). Surveys
have recorded high levels of politically intolerant
predispositions amongst political elites, white and black (34);
to judge from the treatment accorded by township youths to
adherents of unpopular political parties in black communities,
feelings are just as fiercely partisan amongst rank and file
(35).
The passions and energies which underlay popular political
assertions in the 1980s helped to sustain a rebellion of
unprecedented duration and scope. Without an upheaval of this
scale it is difficult to see how De Klerk's administration in
1989 could have decided to embark on the. road to abdication. It
is though, a long road, and for the government's opponents, it
has meant making many concessions. From 1994 until 1989, at
least. South Africa's political system will be that of a "pacted
democracy", a power sharing arrangement which falls well short of
the expectations engendered in the years of insurrectionary
"people's power". Pacted democracies are the result of
agreements between contending elites which do not have the
capacity to decisively defeat each other. They have been a
feature of Latin American transitions from authoritarian rule in
which incumbents agree "to forego appeals to military
intervention1' in return for their adversaries undertaking to
refrain from "efforts at mass mobilisation" (36). A feature of
such transitions are explicit or at least tacit recognitions of
the boundaries of policy contention. Such guarantees are
obviously easiest to maintain if the incoming leadership has not
depended upon widespread popular insurgency to bring about
negotiations. Mass mobilisation can be decisive in breaking down
domination but mobilised masses make a negotiated democratisation
very difficult to sustain. In South Africa in 1989 a "social
stalemate" (37) existed between a regime which could govern only
through coercion and an opposition which lacked the coercive
capacity to overcome the state.
In recognition of this situation, the government, its allies and
its main adversaries have devised a pacted democratisation with
seven key features (38). First, elections will be held on the
basis of a proportional representation/party list system. This
will enable minority political representation but the list system
will strengthen the leadership of the major parties. Elected
parliamentarians will be prohibited from changing their party
allegiance during their terms. Secondly, an "interim
constitution" will be in force immediately after the elections
and for the subsequent five year term of the transitional
government. Parliament will sit as a constituent assembly and
will legislate and vote upon a constitution. A two-thirds
parliamentary majority must approve the constitution. The
interim constitution reflects broad principles to which the final
constitution must also adhere. The authority to interpret these
principles will rest with a constitutional court whose members
will be nominated by the Judicial Services Commission, not the
government. The interim constitution provides for an executive
president, chosen by a majority in the national assembly and
deputy presidents representing those parties with over twenty per
cent of the vote. All parties with more than five percent of the
vote will enjoy cabinet representation. Ministers will be
selected by the president after consultation of the deputies.
The cabinet will attempt to make decisions through consensus but
this is not a constitutional requirement. The House of Assembly
will have 400 members, 200 from the parties' national lists and
200 from their regional lists. Thirdly, nine regional
governments and assemblies, composed according to the same
principles as the national assembly, will be assigned with
specific responsibilities - for example, health, housing and
education, and they will have the power to raise taxes. Disputes
with central government will be resolved by the constitutional
court. Each region will choose ten members of a national Senate.
Fourthly, civil service pensions are guaranteed and Mandela has
on several occasions publicly promised that there will not be
mass dismissals of white public servants (39). Fifthly, the
existing security forces will remain in place subject to their
reform and amalgamation with the much smaller guerilla armies
(40) . Sixthly, a Charter of Fundamental Rights protects
conventional liberal freedoms as well as including clauses which
safeguard private property, guarantee mother tongue education,
and endorse affirmative action. Finally, the ANC has committed
itself to the retention of large scale private enterprise and the
withdrawal of its historical commitment to nationalise "monopoly"
industries (41). These agreements represent significant
constraints on the power of the majority party, even if it
succeeds in winning the two thirds of the vote needed for it to
decide the final constitution by itself. These will serve to
define and limit the ways in which the new government can
implement social and economic reform.
The nature of the South African state will be a crucial
consideration in any calculation of the success of the new
government's programmes. Historically the state has been heavily
interventionist, administratively pervasive, bureaucratically
complex, and extremely large. Counting the homeland civil
services but not the parastatal corporations, the government
currently employs 1,200,000 people (42). Apartheid helped to
cause considerable departmental duplication - for in many fields
up to thirteen ministries share responsibility. Today, the
public service is widely acknowledged to be overmanned. It is
also considered to be inefficient; recruitment to its higher
echelons ceased to be competitive in 1948 and employment in its
lower reaches was for a long time determined by political and
racist principles (43). The central government civil service
remains dominated by whites. White civil servants have for over
a decade helped to frustrate reformist initiatives by government;
politically and socially they tend to be conservative (44). The
homeland civil services are notoriously corrupt; though they are
mainly black in composition, senior white managers have been
implicated alongside homeland citizens in a series of financial
scandals' (45). Financial incompetence and irregularities are not
limited to homeland governments; in particular government
agricultural control boards and developmental agencies have been
conduits for the expenditure of huge sums on evanescent projects
(46).
Even so, in relative terms compared to other African states and
even states in other semi-industrialised developing countries,
South Africa has fairly effective governance, in part a
consequence of the state's high degree of social autonomy. For
the most part, officials conduct their routine transactions with
the public honestly. Tax collection is efficient as is the
financial management of most central government departments.
Until the mid-1980s, the government's administrative reach was
extensive despite the breakdown of influx control, the system of
passes which attempted to limit black urbanisation (47). The
state's social presence is facilitated by highly developed
communications. Until the 1980s, government welfare provision
was expanding and its expenditure on health and education today
continues to exceed the budgetary allocation to security (48).
State sponsored research and development, though insufficient,
still puts the country in a different league of technological and
scientific capacity to the rest of the continent.
Notwithstanding its bureaucratic shortcomings and the possible
political hostility of many of its personnel, the state still
represents quite an effective instrument for the implementation
of reformist programmes.
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For there can be no question that a strong state is a
prerequisite for any strategy to lessen South African poverty.
By themselves, market forces are unlikely to make good the
consequences of decades of state reinforced material inequality.
In 1989, the Second Carnegie Inquiry into South African poverty
published its report. As the most comprehensive survey of its
type, its findings are helpful in defining the magnitude of the
tasks which await a new government. In summary, Carnegie's
investigators found that South Africa was probably one of the
world's most socially unequal societies, with a "Gini co-
efficient" rating of 0.66 in 1971, the highest of 57 countries
measured; data for later years was not available. In 1970, the
richest 20 per cent of the population owned 75 per cent of the
wealth, though this income share had fallen to 61 per cent by
1980. Comparable shares for the richest minority in Brazil were
62 per cent and in the United States, 39 per cent. In 1980, 50
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per cent of the population was existing below "minimum living
levels"", though this figure represented an improvement on the
1960 statistic of 80 per cent destitution. Sixty per cent of
Africans fell into this category in 1980; and 81 per cent of
Africans living in the "homelands". The latter group had risen
in absolute numbers six fold in twenty years. For a
comparatively wealthy country (GNP per head, US$ 2,340), South
African life expectancy was in 1980 unusually low - 54 years.
Sri Lanka, admittedly a special case with its excellent health
services for a third world country, could boast an average
lifespan of thirty years on the basis of GNP per head of US$360.
The Carnegie Report examined the manifestations and consequences
of South African poverty in seven separate spheres: access to
natural resources; work, incomes; unemployment; health; housing;
education; and crime. On the land, Carnegie's researchers found
an ostensibly prosperous farming sector making South Africa self
sufficient in food and an important agricultural exporter.
However even within white-owned commercial agriculture there was
evidence of bad land management, overstocking, heavy erosion, and
desertification. In black-occupied ruxal reserves, population
densities hugely exceeded agricultural carrying capacities,
especially after the forced resettlements of the 1960s. ' Much of
this black rural population had no access to any land at all.
Even so, considerable quantities of arable land were uncultivated
because of the absence of economically active men and women in
towns. Most "black" rural land is overgrazed. Dependence on
firewood for fuel has accentuated ecological degradation; two
thirds of South Africa's population are without electricity,
despite the national generating capacity representing 60 per cent
of Africa's electricity. Nor do most black people in the
countryside have easy access to clean "drinking water. At one
extreme, white daily average water consumption is 200 litres; at
another, Ciskeien rural consumption is nine litres. Water
availability deteriorated sharply during the 1980s drought.
Amongst the ten million or so Africans who are economically
active, in 1985 one million earned wages above "supplementary
living levels ", mostly in manufacturing where real wages rose
from 1970 onwards. Mining wages for a million workers improved
dramatically in the 1970s but remained below other industrial
wages as did the wages of 2 million agricultural labourers.
Domestic servants experienced declining earnings in the 1970s,
while 300,000 African state pensioners received pensions which
rose 142 per cent between 1970 and 1981 but still remained very
modest. All income recipients, though, were relatively
privileged compared to the unemployed, estimated in 1981 to be 21
per cent of the economically active. Sample surveys carried out
in cities in the 1980s suggested higher levels still: 56 per
cent, for instance, in Port Elizabeth in 1985.
Black poverty is reflected in 15 per cent malnutrition in
homelands, and according to different surveys between 1981 and
1985, African infant morality was between 94 and 124 per
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thousand. African infant mortality in South Africa was
significantly higher than in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Congo,
Tunisia, Algeria and Zambia. Though infant mortality fell in
Soweto and in several other urban centres, it appeared in the
1930s to be rising in the East Rand towns, the Eastern Cape and
in homelands. African children died most frequently from
pneumonia, gastro-enteritis, and poor nutrition. Compounding
health problems was an increasingly acute housing shortage in the
1930s, reflecting rapid urbanisation as well as the unwillingness
of the government to build urban housing for blacks in the 1970s.
In 1985 the urban housing shortage was estimated to total 583,000
units; in the three years previously 41,000 houses were built in
black townships. Average house occupancy in Soweto was between
17 and 20 people; in Alexandra, in northern Johannesburg, three
people on average inhabited each room. In migrant labour hostels
up to ninety men could share a single dormitory, with one toilet
provided for every 22 residents.
In education, despite rapid increases in school enrolment in the
1970s, one third of the African population was found by the 1980
census to be illiterate, though 80 per cent of African children
were officially calculated to be attending schools. The census
probably under-counted the black population so the first figure
was actually probably higher and the second lower. State
expenditure on each black school child in 1980 was one seventh
the per capita allocation for whites. Only one tenth of black
school children managed to pass ten years of schooling with only
5,000 in gaining university entrance qualifications in 1978.
Crime statistics also supply telling indices of social distress.
Cape Town, one of the most violent cities in South Africa has a
murder rate in absolute terras three times that of New York. On
the Cape Flats in 1979 there were 1,328 "cases of violent assault
for every 100,000 of the area's inhabitants; the comparable
number in the United Kingdom was 176. Crime rates in rural South
Africa were probably higher (49).
Of course not all of this desperate statistical litany can be
attributed solely to the inequalities of apartheid. Near zero
growth rates in the 1980s, reflecting global trends, and average
demographic increases of the African population of 2.8 per cent
help to explain the expansion of poverty (50). An absolute fall
in agricultural employment accentuated unemployment between 1960
and 1980. This was a consequence of mechanisation of white farms
which was at least partly encouraged by government subsidies to
white farmers. In most respects black poverty has been
exacerbated if not caused by government policies, particularly
with respect to population removals and racially skewed
allocations of expenditure on public health, infrastructure, and
education.
Recent research suggests a slightly more hopeful situation than
the tormented picture which emerges from the Carnegie Report. It
does seem that overall, between 1985 and 1990 blacks slightly
increased their share of personal wealth, from 29 per cent to 33
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per cent, with the white share declining from 59 to 54 per cent;
black real per capita increased slightly in this period, this
despite overall economic stagnation . "Gini coefficient" figures
have probably declined since the very dated study cited in the
Carnegie Report; South Africa's coefficient is believed to be
comparable to other upper middle income developing countries such
as Brazil, Mexico or Malaysia (51). This improvement may reflect
the increasing component blacks represent of the total population
as well as wage hikes in industry. Modern research finds smaller
proportions of the black population live below minimum living
levels than in the Carnegie Report, though the number of those
living in destitution is thought to have increased between 1985
and 1990. Demographers believe that African fertility is on the
decline and that "replacement fertility levels could be reached
within the next generation" (52). But though such long term
trends and forecasts may appear comforting, absolute indications
of deprivation are likely to remain daunting for a long time to
come. Economic growth in the order of 4 per cent is needed
before the total numbers of the poor will diminish. Unemployment
increased absolutely and proportionately in the 1980s; to merely
stabilise unemployment figures, growth rates would have to exceed
8 per cent (53). Housing shortages are currently estimated at
1,200,000 units (54) and they are evident in the huge squatter
camps which have mushroomed over the last decade on the fringes
and in the interstices of every sizable South African town.
School enrolments have increased and about 30,000 African school
children gain university entrance matriculations but despite
increased per capita expenditure (now one third of state
expenditure on each white child) the quality of instruction in
schools is widely believed to have deteriorated as a consequence
of the political disruption of classroom discipline. The number
of very poor people in homelands grew despite a slight fall as a
percentage of the rural population (55). Urban health standards
have almost certainly degenerated; a telling indicator was the
appearance of a typhoid epidemic in Transvaal squatter
settlements in 1993. Aids will contribute a fresh and unwelcome
dimension to an already overburdened health-care system; HIV
prevalence, today low by African standards, is expected to expand
to embrace 8 per cent of the population of Soweto by 2005, that
is, if an effective programme of treatment and public education
is implemented (56) . In summary, in 1994, South Africa is less
socially unequal than it was twenty years before, but the
absolute numbers of hopelessly poor people have grown despite a
measure of redistribution in incomes and government expenditure.
Any new government will have to balance the requirements of
programmes to diminish poverty with those policies which can help
to promote growth. In addition, the government will be
influenced by the imperatives of meeting the expectations of its
most powerful constituencies and securing the loyalty or at least
the acquiesence of the former beneficiaries of apartheid. Today a
wealth of prescriptive literature suggests a set of ingredients
for a "social market" compromise between equity considerations
and those of growth (57). Within the framework of such a
compromise the most minimal strategy to address basic needs
should include the reallocation of educational expenditure and
the reorganisation of institutions to benefit African
schoolchildren; expansion of primary health care; provision of
electricity and clean water through public employment programmes;
limited land reform and a redeployment of state agricultural
subsidies; the promotion of mass construction of cheap housing;
and the creation of safe neighbourhoods through better policing.
Such a programme could relieve poverty significantly and might
also help to stimulate growth. Each of its components merits
brief discussion.
Current governmental expenditure on education is high, about 7
per cent of GNP, and 24 per cent of the budget; the next
government is unlikely to spend much more. White schoolchildren,
ten per cent of the total, absorb about a quarter of the money
spent on schools and about as third of the education budget
altogether. Equalising per capita expenditure could release a
substantial flow of funds to schools in black neighbourhoods; an
increase of fifty per cent in state expenditure on township and
rural schools, educational economists believe (58). It is
possible that administrative rationalisation of thirteen
education departments may produce financial savings in the long
run but in the short term this is most unlikely. Improvements in
African education are more likely to result from a systematic
programme to upgrade African teachers, in particular equipping
them with science and maths skills, employing the grossly under-
used facilities in white teacher training colleges. The ending
of class boycotts and teacher strikes in itself represents an
important advance; in 1993, African urban schools were disrupted
for forty per cent of the academic year. Resources in tertiary
education should be directed at the black technical and
scientific training; at the moment expenditure is skewed in
favour of universities and within them arts and social sciences
subjects. An educational system which can embrace all children
of school going age and which produces larger numbers of
matriculants with economically useful skills is not an Utopian
ideal, after all, most children already receive schooling of some
kind or another. But it would require considerable social
discipline amongst teachers, many of whom today are affiliated to
one of the most militant public sector unions. Whites and black
suburbanites would have to pay more for their access to public
education if the high quality of the institutions their children
attend is to be maintained (59).
The health budget could be reorganised in a similar fashion with
reallocations directed at primary health care which presently
takes up about 15 per cent of government expenditure on health.
Present health spending is more than sufficient in total figures
for a developing country; average per capita funding is ten times
WHO recommendations, so there is plenty of room for
rationalisation and redistribution within the present budget.
The construction of a denser network of rural clinics and
community health centres together with immunisation programmes
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when combined with massive extension of clean piped water and
sewage removal could decisively lower infant mortality within a
short time within the present budgetary limitations, as
experience in Zimbabwe and Namibia has shown (60). 25 per cent
of the population are presently on private medical aid schemes
and, indeed, money spent on private medical care just about
equals the state budget. This degree of privatisation suggests
that there would remain substantive private support for
sophisticated curative medicine. At present the state subsidises
medical aid schemes through tax concessions which favour higher
income earners; this surely calls for revision so that employers
would have greater incentives to supply benefits to larger
numbers of low paid workers. The exodus of medical skills could
be partially stemmed by withdrawing the present very substantial
state financing of medical training in favour of a system which
imposes a fuller proportion of costs on the students. Students
would have access to loans which would include in their repayment
provisions the obligation to work in the public sector.
Low paid public employment schemes might help to reduce the costs
of extensions to electrification, piped water, and sanitation
systems. Policy studies suggest that a doubling of the present
rate of connection to the national electricity grid could be
financed through administrative rationalisation of a byzantine
bureaucracy, the revision of tariff charges (and the effective
collection of these in townships), and a redirection of municipal
expenditure (61). At present white ratepayers are virtually the
sole beneficiaries of services which are partly paid for by
commercial and industrial rates; townships do not have comparable
tax bases to white-governed cities. The racial integration of
local authorities will change this. Given the continuing
predisposition of the larger municipal governments to spend huge
sums of money on unnecessary infrastructure - Pretoria's city
council, for example, recently announced plans to devote R200
million to digging a lake in the main business district (62) - it
is obvious that local government could mobilise considerable sums
for more useful project if it chose to. Mass electrification in
the countryside would represent an especially visible improvement
to people's lives and would of course considerably enlarge the
local market for appliances. This could help to boost employment
in a more substantial fashion than could be achieved by any other
public works programme.
Similarly, a modest programme of land reform and financial
assistance for small farmers would not necessarily require huge
outlay of additional resources to what is presently expended by
the government on agriculture. Some state land is available for
redistribution and sizable expanses of commercial farmland in
border areas have been abandoned by owners (63). Money to
purchase land and establish black farmers might initially be
derived from the scaling down and redirection of existing
government subsidies. In fact white farms, since 1985, have
experienced a sharp reduction of government support, but even so
farmers are still accustomed to receiving generous help at times
of crisis. Four billion rands was spent on drought relief to
white farmers in 1392 (64). White farmers are heavily indebted.
Smallholder-oriented land reform may help to enhance the
efficiency of agriculture generally (65).
It is difficult to see how the ANC will keep its electoral
promise of supplying 1,000,000 houses to Africans in five years
if by such pledges is meant the provision of huge public housing
schemes. In the last few years, African housing construction has
taken place at a rate of between 40,000 and 50,000 dwellings a
year and most of the financing has come from the private sector -
and hence directed at the building of middle class homes (66).
Market forces by themselves are unlikely to increase the scale of
construction to make serious inroads into the housing backlog.
If the state built a million houses it would absorb virtually all
the likely developmental funding at its disposal. State
prescribed investments in low cost accommodation for pension
funds and insurance companies may be one possible source of
financing but of course would take up capital which might be
deployed in more long-lasting forms of job creation. A more
legitimate government might be able to make the traditional
apartheid "site and service" schemes more attractive if these
were combined with land title, access to cheap credit, and a
range of imaginative architectural designs (67).
Creating secure neighbourhoods will require wide-ranging and
expensive police reforms. South Africa is in certain respects
underpoliced and its heavily mechanised and militarised police
force is inadequately trained and equipped for a crime prevention
role. It is also demoralised and poorly paid (68). Public
expenditure on policing will have to increase and is likely to
absorb any of the savings which might result from the reduction
of the army.
The foregoing paragraphs suggest a minimal set of redistributive
measures which would reduce the scope of poverty and inequality
considerably without needing huge leaps in government expenditure
or large flows of external aid. If they are properly directed,
such policies could have a decisive impact on the lives of the
present 40 per cent who receive only 5 per cent of total income
(69). Skilful political leadership will be vital in any efforts
to persuade organised labour to view social investment of this
character as an acceptable substitute for wage hikes. For wage
restraint amongst industrial and public sector workers must be
one crucial precondition for growth in an economy in which wages
count for 71 per cent of national income. The renumeration of
government employees at present use up about half of government
expenditure; raising this proportion would reduce funding
available for social expenditure. Government revenues cannot be
augmented by rises in personal taxation, even radical economists
recognise that this has already reached desirable limits (70).
The 100,000 or so managers and technocrats who run the economy
have skills which are easily marketably elsewhere as current
emigration statistics demonstrate; "soaking the rich" by reducing
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their real incomes through higher taxation would very risky.
Government borrowing cannot be the main source of development
capital; though South Africa is under-borrowed internationally,
public debt to local lenders is very heavy and uses up 17 per
cent of the budget in interest payments (71). Though initially
economic growth might increase as a consequence of public works
programmes, in the long term it will have to be fuelled by the
expansion of manufacturing exports and the inflow of foreign
investment. Fuller incorporation into the international economy
will mean adhering to GATT regulations which stipulate the
abandonment of tariffs and import quotas. Not all factories will
survive exposure to foreign competition (72). A more liberal
trade regime may need to be accompanied by local currency
devaluations and hence inflation. An outwardly oriented growth
strategy will begin by imposing heavy penalties on urban
consumers and industrial workers; effective delivery of social
reform will be crucial if the government is to retain its public
credibility.
ANC proposals for "Reconstruction and Development" more or less
balance equity concerns with growth imperatives through a
strategy of reallocation and rationalisation of existing
resources. Understandably, its electoral appeals place more
emphasis on expenditure than finance; the ANC is not seeking the
votes of bankers and stockbrokers. Elsewhere, though, ANC
spokesmen have already suggested that public expenditure will
only increase slightly overall, that social investments will
mainly be derived from the redirection of available resources,
and that the civil service is already too large (73).
Specifically, the ANC has pledged the redistribution of state
land, a public works programme to provide clean toilets and water
for all within two years, the doubling of. electricity connections
by the end of the century, the expansion of primary health care,
with free access to curative medicine for the aged, the young,
the disabled and the unemployed, the reduction of class sizes in
schools and the provision of free textbooks, and popular
extension of private home ownership facilitated by promptings to
the private sector to supply finance. Parastatal corporations
will be deployed to help the establishment of small businesses
and ANC economic policies will seek to promote manufacturing
exports. The organisation is committed to diversifying
ownership, through anti-cartel legislation if necessary. Tariffs
and protection will be reduced, though with "minimum disruption
to employment". The ANC has more faith than most academic
economists in the capacity of public sector investment to produce
GDP gains; its programme predicts annual increases of 5 per cent
as a consequence of social expenditure. Its policies are not
calculated to entice external investors, promising "no special
advantages" for foreign companies. Undertakings to reduce income
tax for low income earners and to collect corporation tax more
efficiently are in the same vein; here the influence of COSATU
and SACP advisors may have had a decisive influence in the
drafting of the "Reconstruction and Development Programme"
adopted on the eve of the ANC's electoral campaign (74) . Even
li.
so, for a manifesto in a liberation election, the
ANC's vision of "A Better Life for All" is hardly spendthrift
(75).
If surveys are to be believed, the ANC's proposals fall well
short of popular expectations. A poll in September 1993
discovered that 80 per cent of its black respondents thought that
government should supply free housing (76). Nationalisation was
also a popular option and indeed, the National Union of
Mineworkers recently renewed its commitment to public ownership
of the gold mining industry. Specialists debate over the extent
of land hunger (77), but the ANC's land reform proposals look
very restrained when compared with those of the PAC which
advocate the reduction through confiscation of "settler" owned
land by two-thirds (78).
Moreover an ANC-led coalition will encounter formidable
difficulties in implementing even a fairly conservative "growth
through redistribution" programme. A necessary first condition
is a streamlined, cooperative, and competent civil service. This
may be quite difficult to attain . Quite apart from the'question
of the bureaucracy's present political proclivities, there is the
disruption and inefficiency that might result from badly managed
affirmative action (79). The new government will be under
massive political pressure to create jobs through the expansion
of public service. Political opposition could also hinder
progress. Coalition partners may well resist cuts in the
quality of schooling and health care available to whites. They
might also resist efforts by the state to regulate private
patterns of investment. Cuts in commercial agricultural
subsidies will further alienate 67,000 white farmers, most of
whom have already signalled their opposition to power-sharing
Political rivalries which divide the labour movement may assume a
more dangerous significance when the ANC attempts to negotiate
limits to wage claims with its electoral partner, COSATU. Public
works schemes even if they do succeed in creating 300,000 jobs,
as the ANC has promised, will hardly dent unemployment
statistics: 3,000,000 people between the ages of 16 and 30 have
no jobs and more than 80 per cent of the 16 to 19 year old group
are not working. Surveys demonstrate that nearly half the PAC's
support comes from youths aged 17 to 24; the ANC should expect
substantial defections of its own young supporters to its more
radical rival as expectations of the new government are
disappointed over the next five years (80). Even youth
organisations which are nominally affiliated to the ANC have
frequently defied ANC attempts to bring them to heel (81).
Will the twin tasks of addressing social injustice and promoting
growth be completed under democratic conditions? As already
noted, the new constitution embodies a fairly restrictive form
of representative democracy with its stipulations for a coalition
cabinet and deputy presidents from minority parties. Its Charter
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of Rights is weighted in favour of "first generation" freedoms,
that is individual civil rights and minority safeguards. As one
commentator has observed: "the push for a bill of rights comes
not from the heart of the freedom struggle, but from people on
the fringes" (82). Land reform advocacy groups and trade unions
opposed the inclusion of the Charter's property clause. Explicit
and tacit guarantees of existing property relations are indeed an
affront to democratic principles; as Adam Przeworski has argued,
"it is within the nature of democracy that no one's interests can
be guaranteed" (83) . Human rights lawyers are concerned about
what they see as implicit threats to press freedom and academic
autonomy in the constitution. Representation by parliamentarians
selected by party leaderships will remove any element of their
accountability to electors. Neither will regional governments
have any form of constituency representation.
The ANC is likely to win a large majority in the election and it
is almost certainly going to command a sufficient proportion of
cabinet posts. If it feels compelled to, it will be able to
dictate policies to its partners (84). Even so, ANC leaders
probably know that coalitions function best through consensus
(85). Already, in the Transitional Executive Council, a
caretaker body established at the end of 1993 to supervise the
conduct of government during the elections, ANC representatives
have demonstrated their willingess to support unpopular policies,
backing high pay rises for senior civil servants and agreeing to
the retention of preventative detention.
At present, the main threats to democratisation come from
conservative political elites, white and black, and their
organised political followings. Though both the authoritarian
right and the neo-traditionalist Inka'tha movement have the
capacity to make the elections extremely violent they do not have
the resources nor the depth and spread of support to constitute a
serious long term threat to political stability. A crucial
consideration here is the army's disinclination to support any
right wing insurgency. In any case some of the Right's support
is likely to dissipate in the aftermath of voting when more
exaggerated fears prove chimerical (86). More serious challenges
to democratic stabilisation would be mass protests and upheavals
requiring authoritarian measures on a large scale and over a long
period to contain them; these are more likely to come from the
left than the right, especially from organised labour and
mobilised youth, if the pace of social reform is too slow. Such
challenges are not inevitable; for a while at least they can be
averted by imaginative leadership and by public faith in the
democratic process itself - if people feel that they can make
meaningful choices in elections than they are less likely to
contemplate rebellion. Democratic regimes are in certain
respects less vulnerable than authoritarian administrations. As
Samuel Huntington has pointed out: "processes and procedures...
can in substantial measure substitute for the dearth of more
deterministic economic and sociological conditions of democracy
in Third World nations" (87). The presence of COSATU
representatives in government may help to ensure the loyalty of
the better organised sections of the labour movement and may help
to facilitate the establishment of institutionalised forms of
corporatism between government, business and labour (88).
Ironically, however, the very popularity at the polls of the ANC
may be the undoing of democracy. A nationalist movement which
can meet the aspirations of the burgeoning African middle class
through ' affirmative action and enforced corporate "unbundling"
and at the same time retain the support of the most powerful
labour unions through the deployment of government resources
would represent such a formidable political force. It might
always be able to out-manoeuvre electoral opponents whose support
was derived from more vulnerable or marginal groups. One serious
temptation for the ANC in power will be to sacrifice democratic
principles and developmental goals to political expediency and to
draw upon strong statist traditions in South African political
culture to reconstruct the dominant one party system under which
the country has been governed for so much of its history.
5.
What insights does this South African case study contribute to a
more general understanding of the relationship between democracy
and development? Most of the comparative and theoretical
discussion of this topic is directed at confirming whether a
certain level of development is a necessary or at least a helpful
condition for the establishment and stabilisation of democracy.
Quantitative and comparative studies have isolated different
clusters of variables which correlate with the presence of mature
democratic political systems, amongst them: overall wealth,
industrialisation, urbanisation, literacy, large middle classes,
strongly organised working classes, relative social equality,
protestantism, low levels of military expenditure, and high
degrees of economic dependence for trade and investment on
democratic powers (89). The South African experience serves to
confirm many of the generalisations which arise from these
findings, and, like any case study, it cannot suggest any
significant objections or modifications to the contentions which
arise from quantitative research. The few examples of poor and
predominantly rural democracies notwithstanding, it is widely
recognised that most democracies exist in developed capitalist
economies which exhibit the features mentioned above.
A more interesting discussion concerns the question of why the
characteristics of developed capitalist economies seem to
facilitate the establishment of democratic government. First,
there are those arguments which suggest that entrepreneurial
classes if left to themselves construct political institutions
which parallel or reflect the freedom of the market; hence,
liberal democracy is most likely to come about with the political
ascendency of an industrial bourgeoisie and more generally a
large middle class (90). More recently, comparative studies have
focused on "the organised working class (as) the most important
force in establishing democracy" (91). This is a thesis which
the South African case would certainly strengthen. By itself,
the emergence of a "diverse, complex, and interrelated economy"
(92) did little to further the development of democracy in South
Africa. South Africa was by the 1950s an already substantially
industrialised country; contrary to a popular supposition
repeated recently by Samuel Huntington, Apartheid was certainly
"compatible with a complex, wealthy, urban commercial and
industrial economy" (93), at least for a considerable period of
time. Folitical and industrial organisation of subordinate
classes was one decisive factor in favour of democratisation as
were externally imposed economic constraints; neither of these
were entirely predetermined by levels of economic development
Whether organised working classes are seeking liberal democracy
or not is beside the point; in their efforts to gain greater
access to power and resources that is what they usually get.
There is much less consensus and indeed much less consideration
concerning the issue of whether democracy facilitates
development. An implicit assumption of many of the empirical
surveys is that democracy arises from the social changes which
result from economic development. Comparative historical studies
tend to reinforce this contention (94). It does seem much more
difficult, though, to reverse the argument and then to produce
widely valid generalisations. Democracy might have helped and
may continue to help to foster economic progress at certain
developmental stages in individual economies or at particular
moments in world history. The arguments for suggesting that
democracy usually or generally facilitates development seem quite
weak. For example, under ideal circumstances it is easy to see
how democratic government can help to promote economic
competition, vigorous entrepreneurs, rapid social mobility, and
even, perhaps enhanced labour productivity (95), but none of
these sources of economic dynamism are completely incompatible
with authoritarian government and sometimes they may require
authoritarian government to exist at all. If radical social
reform, for example, is needed to create more competitive and
efficient agriculture, than the kinds of liberal democracy which
arise from "pacted" transition may be ineffectual. Economic
modernisation of relatively poor and underdeveloped societies may
impose heavy social and economic costs (96) on potentially
powerful groups. Another theory is that economic decision-making
is more efficient if it is contested rather than left in the
hands of autocratic elites (97). This may be true in an
extremely complex economy but there is no intrinsic reason, as is
sometimes suggested, why such elites should be corrupt or self
serving to the point of being economically inefficient or why
they should be unable to devise policies in the national
interest. That democratic political institutions are a pre-
requisite for economic health has now become a dogmatic orthodoxy
among developmental agencies who often equate democratic
institutions with liberal, that is, minimalist government. This
kind of argument usually underlies the prescriptions imposed on
third world economies by multilateral lending agencies. These
usually simultaneously force governments to impose great
To.
hardships on their main constituents (by abandoning industrial
protection and reducing state employment) while at the same time
cutting back on welfare provisions (98). Enfeebling states is an
odd way to encourage democracy.
In South Africa the promotion of economic growth will certainly
inflict social costs. These might well be managed better in a
political system in which access to political power is quite
socially restricted; this may be one of the developmental
benefits of South Africa's compromised "transitional" democracy.
It would be very dangerous, though, if South African political
progress followed the path taken by other African countries where
democratic commitment has been measured by restrictive government
and market primacy (99) . South Africa's relative industrial
strength and economic sophistication has been built by a strong
interventionist state, not market capitalism. As this essay has
attempted to demonstrate, that strong state is still needed to
foster the conditions for the measure of social justice which
will make the sacrifices required by economic advance acceptable.
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